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On the eve of the twenty-first century, a fin-de-siecle unease
pervades assessments of the future roles of international law.
The recent past seems a poor guide to what promises, or threatens, to be an era posing unfamiliar transnational problems and
calling for innovative legal solutions.' Two developments have
struck at the foundations of contemporary international law.
These are the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent
global retreat of communist ideology, and the resurgence of
ethnicity, religion, and culture as principal bases of identity and
foci of conflict with international significance.2 They have rendered suspect the underlying premises of much received wisdom
on both sides of the debate about whether international law
plays, or would come to play, a major or a marginal role in world
affairs.
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; J.D., 1990, Harvard

Law School; Ph.D. candidate, political science, Government Department, Harvard;
A.B., 1982, Princeton University.
1. On the end of the nineteenth century as an era in which an old, coherent order
had unraveled, and in which new circumstances demanded a new approach or understanding that had not yet formed, see generally CARL E. SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-StECLE VIENNA:

POLITICS Ain CULTURE

3-4 (1981);

GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, AN INTRODUCTION

TO CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 31-32 (1967).

2. As indicated below, these phenomena jointly produce circumstances that frame
the challenges now confronting international law. The two developments are also interrelated in a simpler way. Ethnic tensions and nationalist passions contributed greatly to
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its empire. This collapse, in turn, helped to
unleash ethnic, cultural, and religious politics within and beyond the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. See, e.g., ZBIGNIEw BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE 87-90,

247-50 (1990).
3. See, e.g., INIS L. CLAUDE,JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES 69-80 (1956) (describing

some of more expansive notions of international law's prospective role, under United
Nations, as constraint on states); EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS: 1919-

1939 170-80 (2d ed. 1946) (seeing relatively significant role for international law as law
among community of states); HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 140-42 (1977)
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The result is a crisis in international law, and in thought
about the nature and importance of international law. It is a
crisis in the Chinese sense - a conjunction of danger and opportunity.4 This concept of crisis is apt, for today's dangers and
opportunities come in large part from events in the East (not
least from the Chinese world) and from the choices the West
faces in responding to them. While the crisis is ubiquitous, it is
these East Asian developments, and possible reactions to them,
that provide the principal examples here.
The present challenges are qualitatively different from
seemingly similar past assaults on established notions of international law as part of a "liberal" or "Western" international order.
The new challenges are arguably more severe and certainly more
complex. The possibility of a coherent and relevant response
appears to lie not in a simple defense of familiar ideals but in a
new, and selective, emphasis on human rights and liberal values
as a fighting faith and as a basis for a transnational consensus
among subnational groups.5 If this claim is correct, the project
and the prospect for international law in the coming years are,
perhaps more than is generally recognized, matters of transnational, even domestic, law and politics.
The international legal and political order that is now in
deepening crisis can still be characterized and caricatured as a
liberal order. It posits autonomous, formally equal, sovereign
states as its basic units. States, individually or collectively, are no
(discussing international law's real, if modest, contributions to international order);
HANsJ. MORcANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
279-82, 297-300 (5th rev. ed. 1978) (describing real but quite circumscribed role for law
in international order structured by self-interested pursuits of nation-states seeking
power and security); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 170-76
(1979) (describing international order as defined by distribution of power among
states, with little or no role for law, and bipolar structure as conducive to stability);
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY- COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 245-47 (1984) (assessing, favorably, prospects for cooperative development by "like-minded countries" of rule-like practices and institutions to govern

interactions among states with actually or potentially complementary interests).
4. The Chinese word "weiji" is usually translated into English as "crisis." Weiji is
composed of characters meaning "danger" (wei) and "opportunity" (ji). See THE PINYIN
CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 307, 713 (1983) (providing English translations for all
three Chinese terms).
5. This argument, set forth briefly in this Essay, is explored more fully with respect
to U.S. laws and Chinese human rights issues in a forthcoming article, Beyond Cultural
Relativism and EvangelicalLiberalism: Defining a Role for American and InternationalLaw in
Addressing Human Rigts in China.
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more authorized or justified in examining or forcing changes in
the internal practices and preferences of other states (or in destroying other states) than a person would be in his or her dealings with fellow citizens in a liberal society domestically. Such an
order creates normative and structural imperatives not to recognize and confront diversity in legal and political behavior, and
attitudes within and among states.6
Certainly, this order has not been immune from pressures
for change. The ideological polarization of the Cold War, the
critique of national quests for "modernization" as "Westernization," and the efforts during the last couple of decades to move
human rights farther up on international political and legal
agendas were all in some tension with a Westphalian, nationstate based order.7 Nonetheless, the structure long survived
those corrosive forces, as we saw underscored in the renaissance
surrounding the Gulf War, of collective security pursued within a
framework of venerable international legal rules and conventional international institutions. s Whether such an approach
6. See generally Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 4, 8,

9, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25, 27; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (recognizing duty of nonintervention in states' domestic
choices of political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and inviolability of states'
territorial integrity and political independence); Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies

and ForeignAffairs, 12 PHIL. & PuB. ArE. 205 (1983); Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the
Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 355, 35556, 366-67 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (discussing consequences of conception of
international system as being composed of egoistic sovereign states differentiated only
by power capabilities). ,
7. On the Peace of Westphalia as a defining moment in the emergence of a nationstate-based international order that overcame earlier competing claims founded in purportedly universal norms, see HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETwoRKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 13

(2d ed. 1984). Communist, liberal democratic, and human rights ideologies obviously
entail claims of universal validity that disregard national boundaries. The Westernization-modernization debate is in more subtle tension with a pure nation-state order.
While the charge of "Westernization" suggests a cultural relativism that appears to endorse national autonomy and distinctiveness by rejecting the West as a universal model,
the charge also labels social, political, and legal phenomena that in practice have frequently accompanied economic development or decolonization as something other
than inevitable aspects of modernization. Thus, what might be defended as generically
modern or inevitable is denounced as acquiescence in another contingent ideology
claiming universal applicability. See generally C. E. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION 5-13 (1966) (discussing meaning of modernity).

8. See S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C.
Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N.
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can, or should, remain the paradigm, as the consequences of the
decline of Soviet power and communist ideology and the eruption of subnational and transnational allegiances further unfold,
are much closer questions.
Strong claims, both explicit and implicit, that culture, religion, or ethnicity define the proper boundaries of a sovereign
state, and the appropriate content of its legal rules, are rampant.
On the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia, in the latter-day
Confucian pronouncements of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and
in the proliferating struggles over the place of Islam in society
and government throughout much of Asia, there emerges a
broad challenge to the relevance of an international legal order
that does not take as a central concern cultural differences
among and within nations, and the substantive and substantial
diversity in approaches to domestic and international law and
politics that such differences entail.
The challenge is more profound than a cultural relativist or
anti-colonialist critique, updated for the 1990's and brought into
sharper focus by the removal of the distorting lens of Cold War
politics. In its heyday, the cultural relativist view that Western
legal values, including human rights and other assertedly universal principles of international law, were inappropriate for much
of the world was held primarily by left-leaning Western intellectuals. Such commentators were distrusted as potentially condescending or anti-developmental in much of the recently
decolonized world, and nearly disregarded in the practice of international law and politics.9
SCOR, 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991); H.RIJ. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (enacted as P.L.102-1); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi
Intelligence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. Pas. Doc. 1183 (June 28, 1993) (citing
international law basis, and compliance with U.N. procedures, for action); Remarks to
United States Army Troops Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
1900 (Nov. 22, 1990) (stating U.N. and international law bases for U.S. military presence); cf DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAw OF NATIONS 120-23 (1990) (describing
decline in U.S. government's commitment to international law during 1980's).
9. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, CulturalRelativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HuM.
R-'s. Q. 400 (1984) (providing general and critical discussion of cultural relativism);
Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Application, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES I (Pollis & Schwab
eds., 1980) (setting forth strong version of cultural relativist perspective); BILL WARREN,
IMPERIALISM: PIONEER OF CAPITALIsM 252-55 (1980) (arguing that leaders of former colonies belatedly recognized growth-destroying effects of embracing theories that blamed
underdevelopment on Western-dictated order and rejected progressive colonial legacy

19951

DISQUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT

1729

Where kindred notions had greater practical impact, they
generally proved compatible with an international legal order of
nation-states as juridically equal "black boxes." Thus, anti-colonial and separatist assaults on existing arrangements typically invoked the norms of the existing system 0 - seeking recognition
of a new sovereign state within colonial boundaries or coincident with areas inhabited by a particular people. With borders
redrawn in the name of self-determination around a more culturally or ethnically homogenous group, the new nation could
be absorbed into the fold as just another state with internal affairs of presumptively little international legal import."
Where the international community could not or would not
ignore deviance in domestic legal regimes, excuses and justifications often were available. When illiberal regimes and the consciences of liberal regimes could not find sufficient cover in the
principle of sovereignty over domestic affairs or in the necessity
of accommodating unpalatable allies in the Cold War, the explanation was likely to be that suspect states merely had, for example, struck a somewhat different balance between civil-political
and socioeconomic rights (all of which were highly valued and
universally shared). Alternatively, deviant state conduct might
be dismissed as being part of a necessary transitional period of
progress toward realization of fundamental rights and the rule

of emerging indigenous capitalism). U.S. statutes conditioning aid and trading privileges on the domestic behavior of foreign governments contain little or nothing that
suggests any accommodation of cultural relativist arguments. Typical statutory standards are compliance with the requirements of "internationally recognized human
rights" (a phrase likely to draw the scorn of cultural relativists), market-oriented economic principles, demoLratic government, or free emigration. See 22 U.S.C.S.
§ 2304(d)(1) (1994); 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2295(a) (1994); 12
U.S.C.S. § 635(b)(2) (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(a)(1) (1994) (providing, in security
assistance statute, that United States shall "in keeping with the constitutional heritage
and traditions of the United States" promote observance of human rights in other
countries "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion").
10. See, e.g., ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE INEQUALrIY OF NATIONS 58-60, 67-69 (1977).
11. Although the new nation-states created through decolonization in Asia and
Africa often had much less ethnically and culturally homogenous populations within
more arbitrarily drawn boundaries than did most of the states that emerged from earlier waves of nationalism in Europe (or are now emerging in the former Soviet and
Soviet-dominated areas), the ex-colonial states were more culturally (and geographically) integrated than the vast and European-based empires to which they formerly belonged. See, e.g., CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE PoLMCS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM 11-12, 23-26,
66-71 (1976) (examining interaction of culture, identity, and politics).
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of law.

The culturalist challenge to international law as we enter
the twenty-first century is qualitatively different, and more at
odds with the principles of the existing order, in two ways. First,
such assaults on the integrity of many nation-states and on the
character of their internal political and legal orders are not sim-

ply balkanizing. Rather, they are often supranational, cutting
across international boundaries and binding together dissident
or nationalist groups in several states. Pandemonium looms, but
the fragments also threaten to coalesce into broader clashes of
civilizations.1 Thus, Islam not only defines the fault lines between secular central governments and their religious revivalist
local opponents in China, Malaysia, and nations much nearer
the heart of the Muslim world, and as far west as Bosnia. It also
joins some of these groups together in a shared project that
numbers among its aims a return to the substantive legal and
governmental principles of Islam. 4
12. For an example of both sorts of claims in post-Mao official Chinese pronouncements, see R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practicein Chinese Law
Today, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 41, 67 (Randle Edwards et al. eds.,
1986). For an indication that the post-War U.S. political and legal tradition accords
some substantial recognition to economic and social rights, see KENP6 [JAPAN CONST.]
arts. X-XL (including, in constitution imposed by U.S.-led post-World War II occupation government, social and economic rights, as well as rights similar to those found in
U.S. Bill of Rights, among "human rights" guaranteed to Japanese citizens). For an
indication that contemporary U.S. legislation recognizes some form of the claim that
shortcomings during a "transition period" must be recognized and accepted, see 22
U.S.C.S. § 2295a (permitting aid to states formerly part of Soviet Union if such states
are "acting to... make significant progress toward," interalia, democratic government,
rule of law, and economic reform based on "market principles"); Exec. Order No.
12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993) (conditioning continuation of China's most-favorednation trade benefits on "significant progress" on, not immediate full compliance with,
several specific human rights matters). For the principal statements of international
legal standards for human rights, see generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. 1/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
13. See DANIEL P. MoYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHNICITv ININTERNATIONAL POLITICS
24-25, 168-70 (1993) (arguing that ethnic strife, principally as centrifugal force within
nations, is now greatest threat to international peace and security); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN An'., Summer 1993, at 22, 29-35 (arguing that
"fault lines" between civilizational groupings, generally much larger than nation-states,
"will be the battle lines of the future").
14. See, e.g., Malaysian State Approves Muslim Laws to Cut Off Limbs, Japan Economic
News Wire, Nov. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US file (reporting

1995]

DISQUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT

1731

Second, culturalist challenges to international legal norms,
particularly in the area of human rights, have grown more aggressive and self-confident. Thus, there is little tone of excuse,
request for temporary indulgence, or even much interest in dialogue to be found in Lee Kuan Yew's exegeses on the superiority
of an Eastern way in law and politics that stresses order and community over rights and extreme individualism. The same can be
said of China's post-Tiananmen assertion of its own great human
rights achievements and criticism of Western nations' shortcomings, and its longer-standing dismissal of human rights as a bourgeois concept and mere pretext for Western interference in
China's internal affairs, and of several governments' united insistence upon a valid, distinctively Asian interpretation of human
rights in the face of the 1993 Vienna international conference
on universal human rights.1 5
enactment, in Malaysian province ruled by Islamic opposition party, of punishments
including stoning and whipping as part of effort to govern through Koran-based laws;
laws apply only to Muslims and would require federal government approval); Philip
Shenon, Sungai PenchalaJournal: A Malay Plot? Or Just a Well-Meaning Commune?, N.Y.
TIMFs, Oct. 10, 1994, at A4 (reporting that ground for Islamic Al-Arqam sect leader's
arrest was plot to replace secular government with Islamic fundamentalist regime); Barbara Sopkin, Moslem Fundamentalism Worries East Asian Governments, Agence France
Presse, Aug. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Islamic AI-Arqam and Malaysia's main Islamic opposition party share goal of making Malaysia an Islamic state and that China is cracking down on intervention in secular affairs
by religious groups in heavily Muslim Ningxia area); Catherin Sampson, Bombers Raise
ChineseFears, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File
(reporting that Chinese authorities see bombing incident attributed to separatist Muslims in Xinjiang area in west of country as example of growing cross-border links between Muslims in China and violent fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and Paki-

stan).
15. See Philip Shenon, ToJustify Flogging, Singapore Cites 'Chaos' on U.S. Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at A2 (quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister
of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, as saying that U.S. society is rich, but not safe and peaceful
and not type of society Singapore chooses, and dismissing U.S. talk about human rights
as convenient sloganeering); Fareed Zakaria, Order and Libery, East and West, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1994, at A19 (quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister of
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew as saying that the "expansion of the right of an individual to
behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the
East, the main objective is to have a well-ordered society.... The fundamental difference between Western concepts of society and government and East Asian concepts is
that Eastern societies believe that the individual exists in the context of his family."); see
also GuowuyuAN XINwEN ZHU, ZHONGGUO DE RENQUAN ZHUANGKUANG [STATE COUNCIL
NEws OmcE,THE STATE OF HuMAN PrGHrrS IN CHINA] (1991) (known widely as the
"White Paper"). The White Paper and the Chinese government's subsequent public
pronouncements on human rights issues show an increased willingness to accept that
international standards are relevant and applicable in China. Nicholas D. Kristof, China
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Furthermore, the regimes urging alternative concepts of
purportedly universal legal norms increasingly meet the formal
and procedural requisites of democracy,1 6 thereby weakening
many potential criticisms that invoke liberal international law
principles. At least absent the unlikely and disquieting advent of
17
superstates organized along cultural or civilizational lines, irrelevance or perversity of consequences seems to await any approach to international law that fails to recognize such richly
substantive and strikingly transnational developments as something much more than peripheral issues in a game among coherent, unitary actors, essentially undifferentiated except in
their levels of power.
The crumbling of Soviet power and the retreat of communist ideology inside and beyond the former Soviet empire are
Issues Rebuttal to Human Rights Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, § 1, pt. 1, at 12; Philip
Shenon, Want to Sell China's Record on Human Rights? Get Mr. Smooth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 1994, § 4, at 7 (reporting that president of nominally non-governmental Chinese
Society for Human Rights criticized Western nations' failures on human rights); cf.
Wang Xiujing, Shehuizhuyi renquanyu zebenzhuyi renquan de genben qubie [BasicDistinctions
Between Socialist Human Rights and Capitalist Human Rights] and Li Linmei, Zhuquan
yuanze he renquan de guoji baohu [ The Principle of Sovereignty and InternationalProtection of
Human Rights] in ZHONNGUO SHEHUI KEXUE YUAN FAXUE YANJIusuo, DANGDAI RENQUAN
[CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, LEGAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CONTEMPORARY

HUMAN RjGHTS] 205-20, 362-74 (1992) (post-White Paper publications reflecting the
longer-standing Peoples Republic of China approaches stressing that human rights
have different characteristics in different class society contexts, and the status of national sovereignty over domestic matters as a legal principle in no way inferior to
human rights claims); see also Susumu Awanohara et al., Vienna Showdown, FAR E. ECON.
REV., June 17, 1993, at 16 (describing Asian critique of Western attempt to impose
"Western traditions" in guise of human rights); Michael Vatikiotis, CulturalDivide, FAR
E. ECON. REv., June 17, 1993, at 20 (describing emerging East Asian theory of "situational uniqueness" to justify "distinctive positions on human-rights issues"); Gordon
Fairclough, Standing Firm, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 15, 1993, at 22 (reporting Asian
nations' agreement in preparation for Vienna Conference on Bangkok Declaration,
which stresses non-interference in internal affairs and "socio-economic, historical and
cultural backgrounds" as legitimate sources of human rights variations).
16. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWETIETH CENTURY 5-9, 21-26, 28-30 (1991) (discussing trend towards democracy
since mid-1970's).
17. On the continuing strength and importance of states in an era of "civilizational" cleavages and loyalties, see Fouad Ajami, The Summoning, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.Oct. 1993, at 2, 9 ("[C] ivilizations do not control states, states control civilizations.").
The difficulties and dangers of any attempted transition to civilization-states lie, not
least, in what would be required to overcome the persisting strength of nation-states, in
the near-impossibility (absent massive dislocation of people) of drawing boundaries in
mixed areas, and in the potential multiplication of ethnic and nationalist pressures for
disintegration that already plague more modestly sized nation-states.

1995]

DISQUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT

1733

central elements in another challenge to the existing order in
international law and politics. Shaken, indeed shattered, are a
bipolar structure and a polarizing ideology that together made
the nation-state the central institutional focus and marginalized
concern with differences in legal and political regimes among
and within nations, except for those differences immediately relevant to the Manichean struggle between communism and liberal democracy.
It has become less plausible to conceive of international law
and politics in either of two familiar ways: (1) as a global order,
anchored by two superpowers, in which two types of states,
although very different internally, can interact under shared and
neutral, albeit sparse, rules, even as they take sides in other
countries' civil conflicts (conceived of as conflicts over which
"side" such ultimately unitary states will join); or (2) as a partial
order among the nations of the West and some of their ex-colonies in which the United States, as hegemon, provides and enforces more elaborate, more law-like rules of international interaction within a more limited community."8 Exposed and perhaps encouraged by the decline of such analytical frameworks
and the patterns of behavior they explained and endorsed is a
world in which states are more seriously fragmented internally,
with many groups embracing radically divergent ideas about domestic and international law, and sharing common goals with
like-minded groups in other countries.
Such challenges to the received order might appear to be
mere extensions of developments recognized for the last twenty
years or more. Certainly, "interdependence theory" in international relations scholarship, academic legal arguments for focusing on "transnational law" (and not the narrower, more statecentric field of "international law"), and the practices such arguments reflected and influenced all sought to deal with a world in
which legal and political rules could not assume that nationstates were internally cohesive and externally impermeable. 9
18. Such views of international relations run through political scientists' writings
on international relations, although their theories make surprisingly little reference to
international law. See MORGANTHAU, supra note 3, at 282, 363-64 (discussing first view);
WALTZ, supra note 3, at 193 (discussing first view); see also KEOHANE, supra note 3, at 3139 (discussing second view).
19. ROBERT 0. KEoHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
PoLmcs tN TRANSMON 3-8, 23-28, 33-36 (1977); HENRYJ. STEFNER & DETLEV F. VAGTS,
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Nonetheless, the concerns that animated those responses
seemed to require, at most, only moderate reform of the established order.
Before the widespread retreat from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and before the Soviet implosion, the most visible forces undermining a state-centered international legal order were market-oriented economic exchanges, organizational networks
among cosmopolitanly-educated elites in business, government,
or citizens' groups, and ties that linked groups in industrial democracies and narrow segments of the rapidly developing
world.2 0 Generally, the political focus of such transnationally
linked groups was on relatively narrow issues and on influencing
national laws and policies through established, legitimate channels. There was little in this that immediately and fundamentally
challenged the political integrity of the relevant sovereign states
or that seemed any more seriously in tension with a liberal inter1
national order than domestic liberalism always had been. 2
Although it is hard to demonstrate with certainty, we now
seem to face a more volatile combination of deeper and more
varied intranational schisms between groups and potentially
stronger international links among them. Cold War organizational and ideological structures are no longer available to suppress, channel, or at least mask, primordial or nascent cleavages
(3d ed. 1986); PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANsNATIONAL LAW
2-3 (1956).
20. Interdependence with the industrial democracies and the rest of the Westernlinked world was limited for pre-reform communist states by such states' monistic and
totalistic domestic political structures and ideologies that limited the growth of the kind
of autonomous groups that established transnational networks elsewhere, and by their
autarchic approach to international economic relations rooted in a "siege mentality"
reinforced by Western hostility (sometimes reflected in statutes governing international
economic relations). See TONY SMITH, THINKING LIKE A COMMUNISr: STATE AND LEGrrIMACV IN THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND CUBA 182-85, 191-92 (1987) (discussing essential characteristics of communist thought); see also A. Doa BARNETT, CHINA IN THE
WORLD EcONOMY 122-32 (1981) (describing struggle between Cultural Revolution radicals and proponents of reform about political significance of opening China to foreign
investment and trade). For U.S. statutes denying trade and aid to communist countries,
see, e.g., 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994) (tying countries' most-favored-nation ("MFN") status
to emigration freedoms they grant to citizens); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2370 (1994) (prohibiting
assistance to present Cuban government).
21. For illustrations of the tensions between some liberal principles (chiefly equality) when applied to states and when applied to individuals without regard to international boundaries, see Tucker, supra note 10, at 61-62; CHARLES R. BErrz, PoLuc.AL
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65-66, 182 (1979).
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in seemingly countless states, old and new. In Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, in reform-era China, and in the
rapidly developing nations of East Asia, the network of transnational economic ties has expanded rapidly to encompass, and to
penetrate more deeply, areas that are more thoroughly nonWestern in their legal and political cultures and less fully marketoriented in their laws, policies, and practices. Moreover, with
new legal tolerance and new technology, a diverse transnational
flow of ideas has rapidly come to supplement, and sometimes
threaten, ties based on business or on narrow issues.
Thus, Chinese leaders determined to rein in perceived excesses of reform face not merely the risk that hard-won, modest
advances toward rule by law may wither, but also the prospect of
stinging trade sanctions under U.S. law and costly U.S.-backed
delays injoining world trade bodies.22 Domestically, they face an
unprecedentedly Westernized and outward-looking group of dissidents and critics who are sophisticated about, and insist upon,
domestic law reform and adherence to international legal
23

norms.

Similarly, a Malaysian political leadership that downgrades
Malay-Muslim nationalism and economic planning to reaffirm a
secular legal order, the benefits of English education in accessing Western knowledge, and the virtues of pro-market laws and
22. See Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 12; Lionel Barber & Nancy Dunne,
FearsGrow that Bush Will Back Doun on China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, § I, at9 (describing mixture of human rights and trade issues in negotiations between president and
Congress over conditions to be imposed on renewal of China's MFN status); cf. Thomas
L. Friedman, China Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, § 4, at 19 (reporting that U.S.
business executives who support United States' imposing trade sanctions against China
for intellectual property violations and blocking China's entry into World Trade Organization, see link between Chinese government's human rights abuses and trade abuses,
with both reflecting absence of rule of law).
23. See, e.g., Wei Jingsheng, The Fifth Modernization, in THE FiIrH MODERNIZATION:
CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1978-1979 (James D. Seymour ed., 1980) (presenting argument, by one of leading participants in Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79,
that post-Mao regime should and must recognize human rights); William P. Alford,
Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People's Republic of China, in
CHINA IN TRANsFORMATION 45, 45-46, 57-59 (Tu Wei-ming ed., 1994) (detailing attempts
to seek judicial redress against Party and state organs and officials, principally for actions taken against plaintiffs in connection with plaintiffs' roles in 1989 protests); Patick E. Tyler, In Beijing, Dissidents File New Petitions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at A8
(reporting that, in order to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, Chinese
dissidents petitioned National People's Congress to strengthen rule of law, and to undertake investigations of cases where citizens' legitimate rights have been violated by
authorities).
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policies confronts newly radical challenges from movements that
seek to enact Islamic law as state legislation or that threaten to
become a diffuse state within the nation, beyond the reach of
sovereign power. The regime, correctly or not, sees conspiracies

that cross national boundaries and a rising international tide of
Islamic fundamentalism behind its troubles, and feels compelled
to prove its own Islamic bona fides even as it cracks down on religious radicals.2 4 In such a world, a perspective that sees a prime
virtue in legal rules that are simple, uniform, and international
(in the sense of being rules for and among nation-states) does
not portend a central and leading role for law in international
affairs.
The great danger for those who favor a strong role for national law in the coming years is a failure to adapt to the challenges of internal fragmentation and transnational ties. Several
signs of the perils of a failure of imagination are visible. First, an
attempt to reanimate some of the hoariest principles of the past
seems doomed to frustration. Relying on principles of collective
security and the sanctity of sovereign states, and organized in
large part through the United Nations, the Gulf War alliance increasingly seems confined to its facts and the stuff of nostalgia incapable of repetition, yet subject to pervasive review.2 5 Beset
with doubts about the appropriate grounds and practical conse24. William Case, Malaysia in 1993: Accelerating Trends and Mild Resistance, 34 AsLaN
SURV. 119, 120-24 (1994) (describing government's policies); Malaysian State Approves
Muslim Laws to Cut Off Limbs, supra note 14; see generally Wu MIN AUN, THE MALAYSIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 38-40 (1990) (describing jurisdiction of Islamic courts in Malaysia); Ahmed Rashid, March of the Militants, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 9, 1995, at 19 (reporting
Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir's banning of fundamentalist Islamic AlArqam sect, in part for training death squad in Thailand); Shenon, supra note 14, at A4
(noting that Islamic AI-Arqam sect claims numerous sympathizers abroad); Michael
Richardson, Malaysia and Neighbors to Curb Sects, IrN'L HERALD TRuB., Aug. 5, 1994, available in, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Islamic Al-Arqam sect operates some 50 villages in Malaysia with schools, shops, health clinics, and other facilities
for members; that sect is banned, or faces banning, in Indonesia and Brunei; that its
leader is banned from three neighboring countries; and that 19 Malaysian members of
sect were arrested at Cairo fundamentalist demonstration in April, 1994); Sopkin, supra
note 14 (reporting that AI-Arqam sect leader lived in exile in Jordan after 1988).
25. For analyses of the Gulf War's implications for international law and U.S. foreign relations law, and a recognition that replicability of the Gulf War approach is severely limited, see Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for InternationalLaw from the Gulf War, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 425 (1993); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L.452 (1991); Bums H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, Continued, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 516 (1991); Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War
and the Constitution, FOREIGN A., Spring 1991, at 84.
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quences of intervention, the tortured and hesitant multilateral
efforts to address the Bosnian crisis may better indicate the fate
awaiting such conventional approaches under the conditions
likely to prevail in the coming years.
Second, the international legal enterprise shows signs of
shrinking toward public regulation of international trade and investment. That possibility is illustrated by the Clinton Administration's East Asian diplomacy that has emphasized international
legal standards for fair trade, U.S. laws that impose trade sanctions or deny most-favored-nation status, and cabinet-level road
shows to promote U.S. business abroad. 6 Here, the international legal norms of free trade amid limited economic nationalism are relatively steady beacons, and the recognition of subnational actors with transnational links (and domestic legislative
and regulatory agendas) can be relatively frank and open. 7
Such an approach, however, threatens to exclude from the central focus of international law much that is of interest and importance in world affairs.
Third, imprecise notions of broad principles of international law or isolated fragments of international law doctrines
both may be invoked haphazardly and unsystematically to support particular actions. The United States' humanitarian intervention in Somalia, its delayed intervention by invitation in Haiti, and its decoupling of human rights and trade in China, suggest the ambiguities and limitations of such approaches to the
uses and meaning of international law. Without some integrat26. See, e.g., Susumu Awanohara & Nayan Chanda, Uncommon Bonds, FAR E. ECON.
Ray., Nov. 18, 1993, at 16-17 (reporting that U.S. goals at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") forum are to accelerate global trade liberalization, and to strengthen
trade with Asia); David E. Sanger, President Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1995, § I, at 1 (announcing sanctions to be imposed under "super 301" provision
of trade statutes, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2420); Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 12; Patrick E.

Tyler, Ron Brown in China: Trade Gets an Open Door, Human Rights the Closet, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1994, § 4, at 2 (reporting on mission to China by U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown and U.S. executives to promote signing of agreements between U.S. firms and
Chinese).
27. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 22, at 19 (reporting pressure and support from
U.S. business interests in decisions to de-link MFN and human rights, and to impose
sanctions for Chinese violations of intellectual property rights); Sanger, supra note 26,
at 1 (reporting U.S. Administration's explanation of how sanctions were crafted so as to
minimize harm to U.S. industries and consumers); Awanohara & Chanda, supra note
26, at 16-17 (quoting U.S. State Department official on importance of domestic job
growth in U.S. approach to APEC summit).

1738

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 18:1725

ing strategy or guiding norms, it proves exceedingly difficult to
articulate determinative criteria, especially ones sounding in international law, for deciding what action to take, what counts as
successful action, and why to act in one case and not in an28
other.
Nevertheless, the crisis confronting international law
presents opportunities as well as dangers. For those in the West
who seek a vibrant role for international law, there is something
potentially liberating in the new cultural challenge's shaking the
early post-colonial belief in an elaborate and largely inseverable,
if internally contradictory, package of a liberal legal order
among nation-states and liberal legal orders within states. The
same can be said of the impact of the Soviet collapse and the
more widespread softening of communism on the sense of mortal duty to promote and protect that package unquestioningly.
With former senses of confidence and urgency gone, proponents of a liberal order and a leading role for law in global affairs may, indeed must, turn to a more critical examination of
their goals and a more strategic approach to the roles of international law.
The critical examination entails an inquiry into what on the
laundry list of specific human rights, democratic values, sovereignty, self-determination, and the like make the most compelling demands now that it seems impossible, and unnecessary, to
pursue simultaneous progress on all fronts. Given the decline in
28. For the variety of international legal principles available, and the flexibility of
their connections to a course of action, delayed action or inaction, see Letter to the
President, 13 Op. OFF. LEGAL CoUNs. 6, 7 (1992) (suggesting that "principles of customary international law"justify planned American military intervention in light of "urgent
need for humanitarian assistance" and "breakdown of governmental authority," but declining to decide the issue in light of other sources of authority, including Security
Council resolution authorizing all necessary means for promoting humanitarian relief,
statutory authorization for humanitarian aid, and President's general authority over use
of troops); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY COMP. Pars. Doc. 1801
(Sept. 18, 1994) (citing, in support of troop deployment after international accord
reached, U.N. resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to restore democratic government, particular national security interests of United States in responding to gross
abuses of human rights and in promoting restoration of democratic government); The
President's News Conference, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1166 (May 26, 1994) (because "best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human
rights" in China is through continuation of most-favored nation status and promotion
of increased contacts, President will extend China's MFN trade status despite China's
failure to satisfy standard, mandated as condition of renewal in previous year's China
MFN executive order, of "overall significant progress" in specific areas).
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the persuasive power of Cold War, cultural relativist, and anticolonial justifications for an order based upon unitary nationstates, the most appealing and promising move may be to shift
emphasis toward the previously subordinate project: international law's contribution to the promotion of liberal values
within nations. Thus, minimal dignitary interests - freedom
from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, or severe material deprivation - may merit pride of place, possibly on the ground that
little else of value can be secured in their absence.2 9 Alternatively, political process values, such as democratization, might
warrant preeminence, perhaps on a theory that such principles
best combine the promise of participation, which may be valued
for its own sake, and of a mechanism well-suited to the achievement of preferred substantive outcomes.3 0
If a persuasive lexical ordering of specific values proves elusive or incomplete, a strategic approach becomes all the more
essential. A strategic approach requires asking whether it will be
successful or efficient to undertake expenditures of concededly
limited material and moral resources to advance the realization
of particular principles. Promotion of minimal dignitary interests, for example, may score high in expected efficacy, for these
interests may well be matters of broad transnational consensus
29. That intuition would also appear to be reflected in the tendency of interna-

tional human rights organizations to focus much of their energy on questions of arbitrary or politically motivated detention, severe custodial punishments and the like. See,
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995 (1994); ASIA WATCH, ANTHEMS OF DEFEAT: CRACKDOWN IN HUNAN PROVINCE, 1989-92 (1992); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TOR-

e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS

TURE IN THE EIGHTIES 4-5 (1984); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1978).

30. Compared to the vision evident in some earlier American forays into promotion of democracy abroad, it is likely that such a notion of democratization will have to
be relatively sparse in its requirements, and thus relatively broad in its definition of
what is to be expected or accepted. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON &JOAN M. NELSON, No
EASY CHOIcE 42 (1976) (noting that developing countries face trade-offs among increasing political participation, increasing economic growth, and fostering social and economic equality). Compare HUNTINGTON, supra note 16, at 164-209, 253-58 (describing
considerable variety of methods by which, and contexts in which, recent transitions to
democracy have occurred, and have differed from earlier "waves" of democratization)
and GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORrIARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986) (noting
same) with ROBERT PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD 123-30 (1973)

(discussing U.S. conviction in the 1950's and 1960's that U.S.- aid could result in economic growth, broadly rising standards of living, stability, and democratic politics all
emerging smoothly, mutually reinforcingly, and along essentially U.S. or Western lines
in developing countries).
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(and of even broader lip-service). Alternatively, democratic values may seem strong candidates because their lack of obvious
and immediate substantive content promises flexibility sufficient
to accommodate diverse political and legal cultures.
Such ruminations over pragmatism and principle are initially likely to occur primarily in major industrial democracies'
domestic debates about foreign affairs laws and policies. Some
elements of the approach they might yield are already in place,
although those elements are at best fragmentary and subject to
much revision. The U.S. Code, for example, includes numerous
provisions imposing sanctions or denying aid on the basis of
other states' noncompliance with a variety of specific international human rights or liberal economic standards.31 Those
standards might reflect some of the norms that U.S. citizens
most prize or that the United States can most fruitfully promote
abroad, or they could be replaced by standards that do incorporate such norms. Common statutory provisions that trigger legal
consequences only upon findings of "consistent patterns" of
"gross violations" of human rights in target countries, and the
partially discretionary character of many statutory sanctions suggest a recognition of the importance of prudential concerns. 2
They also suggest room for an approach that addresses them

31. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(d)(1) (1994) (representing typical provision defining "gross violation of internationally recognized human rights" - a basis for denying
security assistance - as including "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons"); 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994) (prohibiting MFN status for "non-market
economy country" that denies or financially burdens emigration); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2295(a)
(1994) (conditioning aid to former Soviet Union countries on respect for internationally recognized human rights including rights of minorities and freedom of religion
and emigration, and on progress toward democratic system, representative government, rule of law and economy based on market principles, and private ownership); 12
U.S.C.S. § 635(b) (2) (1994) (prohibiting Export-Import Bank credits to countries with
Marxist-Leninist planned economies).
32. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.S. § 2151 (a) (1994) ("consistent pattern of gross violations"
provision in development assistance statute); 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432(c)(2) (1994) (providing that President has authority to waive MFN prohibition upon determination that
waiver will promote statute's goals); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(a)(2) (1994) (providing that
President has authority to waive security assistance ban upon determination that certain
.extraordinary circumstances" exist); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2295a(c) (providing that President
has authority to extend aid to ineligible countries of former Soviet Union upon determination that providing assistance would be in national interest or would promote statute's substantive goals).
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under a more coherent and systematic policy, and less in an ad
hoc manner.
These prudential concerns also point to the other side of
the opportunities presented by the intranational fragmentation
and transnational linkages that seem to characterize the era now
upon us. Within the nations of the East and the South, significant groups have come to adapt and adopt as their own views
quite compatible with many items on an imaginable agenda for
promoting liberal domestic legal orders and a robust role for
international law. 3 Underscoring the dynamism and indeterminacy of approaches to law and politics outside the West, the presence of such groups undermines simplistic cultural relativist critiques, and offers fertile soil for transnational linkages to foster
domestic legal and political changes on a front much broader
than that promised by international economic interdependence.
By establishing ties with like-minded counterparts in the West
and by making appeals to international legal principles, such
groups may find material, diplomatic, and intellectual resources
with which to strengthen their hands at home. Thus, for important segments of profoundly diverse societies, prudence and
principle can coincide both in defining the roles of international law and in shaping domestic law in non-Western nations.
What emerges is a prospective role for international law in
which it becomes more closely linked to domestic legal orders
and global liberal agendas in a species of transnational law for
the twenty-first century. With the notion of international law's
project so conceived, advocates of strong roles and liberal content for such law can keep faith with their own core principles
(albeit a more eclectic and pragmatic subset of those principles).
At the same time, these advocates can keep faith with the future
sought by their counterparts outside the West who are engaged
in struggles to promote similar values in their nations' domestic
legal orders and their states' engagement with the international
legal order.

33. See, e.g., Sidney Jones, The Organic Growth:. Asian NGOs Have Come into Their
Own, FAR E. ECON. REv., June 17, 1993, at 23 (noting importance of Asian non-governmental organizations' efforts in forcing Asian governments to heed demands of poor,
marginalized, and abused).

